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IS AN INJUNCTION THE RIGHT
VEHICLE TO COMBAT CLIMATE
CHANGE?:  GREENWASHING AND
THE IMPORTANCE OF INCREASING




Human activities that release greenhouse gasses (“GHG”), espe-
cially the burning of fossil fuels, contribute substantially to global warm-
ing and climate change.2  With a warming climate comes numerous
adverse impacts, including extreme weather events, rising sea levels,
drought, and increased exposure to infections.3  The consequences of cli-
mate change have affected and will continue to affect communities on
every continent, with some vulnerable populations, such as children in
poor countries and the elderly, at greater risk of harm.4  A recent World
Health Organization (“WHO”) assessment concluded that climate change
is expected to cause an increase of approximately 250,000 deaths per
year between 2030 and 2050.5  GHG emissions continued to increase
from 1970 to 2010, with carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel com-
1 Caesaria Kim is a second-year Juris Doctor Candidate at Golden Gate University School of
Law. The author would like to acknowledge the ELJ editors and Professor Fiona McKenna of GGU
for their thoughtful feedback in developing this project.
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bustion and industrial processes contributing around seventy-eight per-
cent of the total GHG emission increase.6
In the face of the climate crisis, people are increasingly interested in
more sustainable and eco-conscious alternatives to fossil fuels.  As a re-
sult, companies associated with fossil fuel industries are under pressure
to conform to this trend among consumers by marketing themselves as
leaders in developing sustainable alternatives.7  However, instead of
changing their practices in an effort to mitigate climate change, some
companies only promote the appearance of change by engaging in
“greenwashing.”8  Greenwashing is defined as the “practice of mislead-
ing people to believe that a company is engaging in virtuous practices so
as to cover up poor practices” or relying on appearances instead of real-
ity; i.e., relying on good marketing instead of actual change.9
One company accused of greenwashing their image is Exxon Mobil,
Inc. (“Exxon”), the oil and gas producer.10  Their recent marketing strat-
egy and advertisements feature new research purporting to make a differ-
ence by developing biofuels from algae as an alternative to fossil fuels.11
These claims are now being called into question in multiple lawsuits al-
leging that Exxon is deliberately misleading the public to greenwash
their image.12
On the surface, biofuels research sounds like a promising step to-
wards sustainability, as the fuels would be created from algae rather than
fossil fuels.13  Biofuels from algae are considered to be a prime candidate
for alternative fuels, because atmospheric GHG is decreased during the
process, as the cultivation of algae uses up a large amount of carbon
dioxide.14  Exxon prominently displays their biofuels research in their
6 INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), Summary for Policy
Makers, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 8 (O. Edenhofer et al. eds.,
2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg3/ipcc_wg3_ar5_summary-for-policyma
kers.pdf.
7 Emily Plec & Mary Pettenger, Greenwashing Consumption: The Didactic Framing of Exx-
onMobil’s Energy Solutions, 6 ENV’T COMMC’N 459, 459-60, 465 (2012).
8 Francesco Bassetti, Is Greenwashing a Sign of Real Change?, FORESIGHT: THE CMCC OB-
SERVATORY ON CLIMATE POLICIES AND FUTURES (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.climateforesight.eu/
global-policy/greenwashing-a-signal-of-change-to-come/.
9 Id.
10 Emily Holden, How the Oil Industry has Spent Billions to Control the Climate Change
Conversation, NAT’L OBSERVER (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.nationalobserver.com/2020/01/09/news/
how-oil-industry-has-spent-billions-control-climate-change-conversation.
11 Id.
12 Geoffrey Supran & Naomi Oreskes, Big Oil Is the New Big Tobacco. Congress Must Use
Its Power to Investigate, GUARDIAN (Jan. 20, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2020/jan/20/big-oil-congress-climate-change.
13 Plec & Pettenger, supra note 7, at 467-68.
14 Anoop Singh et al., Mechanism and Challenges in Commercialisation of Algal Biofuels,
102 BIORESOURCE TECH. 26, 26 (2011).
2
Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol13/iss1/5
2021] IS AN INJUNCTION THE RIGHT VEHICLE? 89
marketing materials, including the front page of their corporate
website.15
However, the algae research program at Exxon actually accounts for
only a very small portion of the corporation’s available budget.16  In
2016, Exxon spent less than one percent of its annual revenue on alterna-
tive energy research.17  By failing to mention that the company’s contri-
bution to alternative energy is relatively miniscule in comparison to its
fossil fuel products, Exxon’s biofuels advertisements mislead consumers
into believing that they are making responsible choices for the environ-
ment when buying Exxon’s products.18  But this discrepancy only
scrapes the surface of the extent of Exxon’s deceptive marketing tactics
in relation to global climate change.
Recently uncovered internal documents revealed that Exxon’s
scientists had knowledge that their products had the potential to the
change the climate since the 1950s.19  By the late 1970s and early 1980s,
Exxon was “explicitly aware that burning fossil fuels” could lead to “cat-
astrophic global warming.”20  Exxon not only failed to disclose this in-
formation to the public but continued to promote their products.21  As
awareness of climate change became more mainstream in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, Exxon went further and began to publish advertisements
that denied the existence of anthropogenic climate change and global
warming.22  For example, in 2000, Exxon published an advertorial in the
New York Times, calling climate change an “Unsettled Science.”23  In the
advertorial, Exxon falsely stated that scientists have not been able to con-
firm that human activity is causing global warming — despite the fact
that scientists had formed a consensus that human activity was causing
global warming in the 1990s.24
In response to these disclosures, three public plaintiffs — Connecti-
cut, District of Columbia, and Massachusetts — are now bringing legal
15 EXXON MOBIL, ExxonMobil and Porsche Are Testing Advanced Biofuels and Renewable,
Lower-Carbon eFuels, https://corporate.exxonmobil.com (last visited April 2, 2021).
16 Holden, supra note 10.
17 Complaint at 48, District of Columbia, v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (D.C. Super. Ct. June 25,
2020) (No. 2020 CA 002892 B) [hereinafter D.C. Complaint].
18 Complaint at 34, Connecticut v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 14, 2020) (No.
HHDCV206132568S), 2020 WL 5522920 [hereinafter Connecticut Complaint].




23 JOHN COOK ET AL., AMERICA MISLED: HOW THE FOSSIL FUEL INDUSTRY DELIBERATELY
MISLED AMERICANS ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE 8, GEO. MASON UNIV. CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
COMMC’N (2019), https://www.climatechangecommunication.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/
America_Misled.pdf.
24 Id. at 5.
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actions against Exxon to stop these deceptive practices by suing under
their respective consumer protection laws.25  All three complaints (“the
Complaints”) outline prayers for relief seeking monetary damages for the
alleged injuries Exxon inflicted on consumers.26  The alleged injuries
listed in the Complaints include misleading consumers by telling them
climate change and global warming are not real risks, and subsequently,
asserting that Exxon is not a contributor to these ‘fictional’ dangers.27
All three complaints also seek to enjoin Exxon from continuing its
greenwashing practices, which is the focus of this comment.28
Notably, all three complaints argue for the necessity of an injunc-
tion to stop Exxon’s greenwashing by drawing comparisons between the
oil industry’s deceptive practices and those made infamous by the to-
bacco industry.  Like the tobacco industry, they argue, the oil industry
knew of the harmful effects of their activities but failed to publicly reveal
this information and denied the effects externally.29  The Complaints fur-
ther allege that Exxon’s greenwashing has influenced consumers’ actions
in a manner similar to the way tobacco companies used deceptive adver-
tising to encourage consumers to buy their products by denying and
downplaying the negative effects of these products.30  By asking for in-
junctive relief and an education program to inform the public of the neg-
ative effects of petroleum products, the Complaints seek to restrict the
deceptive advertising of oil products in a manner similar to the way to-
bacco advertising was restricted in order to change consumer behavior.31
This comment will explore the implications of these cases with re-
spect to a key difference between Big Oil and Big Tobacco, which is
that, unlike tobacco, many aspects of our society still depend on oil and
gas.  Responsible advertising, like that which helped curtail the use and
sales of cigarettes, may not be as effective when it comes to oil.  Many
25 Connecticut v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. HHD-CV-206132568S (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 14,
2020); District of Columbia, v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 2020 CA 002892 B (D.C. Super. Ct. June
25, 2020); Commonwealth v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 1984-CV-03333 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 24,
2019).
26 Connecticut Complaint, supra note 18, at 44; D.C. Complaint, supra note 17, at 77; Com-
plaint at 204-05, Commonwealth v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 1984-CV-03333 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct.
24, 2019) [hereinafter Massachusetts Complaint].
27 Connecticut Complaint, supra note 18, at 2; D.C. Complaint, supra note 17, at 32-34;
Massachusetts Complaint, supra note 26, at 28-29.
28 Connecticut Complaint, supra note 18, at 44; D.C. Complaint, supra note 17, at 77; Massa-
chusetts Complaint, supra note 26, at 205.
29 Justine Calma, To Take Down Big Oil, Opponents are Following the Big Tobacco
Playbook, VERGE (Oct. 23, 2019, 9:50 am EDT), https://www.theverge.com/2019/10/23/20927522/
exxonmobil-trial-big-oil-big-tobacco-investors-environmental-regulations.
30 Connecticut Complaint, supra note 18, at 7; D.C. Complaint, supra note 17, at 4; Com-
plaint at 12-13, Massachusetts Complaint, supra note 26, at 5.
31 See e.g., Connecticut Complaint, supra note 18, at 45.
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people still have little personal choice as to whether to participate in the
oil economy because they rely on oil for fueling cars and homes and
many other uses.  Therefore, in order to be effective in the fight against
climate change, an injunction prohibiting Exxon’s greenwashing should
be paired with government efforts to develop alternatives to petroleum
products that will give consumers a real choice.  Alternatives can include
increasing access to greener transportation such as electric vehicles, as
well as public transit and active travel.
This comment begins with an overview of the deceptive advertising
practices that were used by the tobacco industry and those used more
recently by the oil and gas industry, focusing on Exxon in particular.  It
then takes a closer look at the relief sought in these cases and considers
how the differences between these industries might limit the effective-
ness of restricting greenwashing.  Finally, the comment recommends ad-
ditional government actions to enhance the impact of the current lawsuits
in addressing climate change.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to understand the limitations of the proposed analogy be-
tween the deceptive advertising by big tobacco and the alleged green-
washing by Exxon, an overview of their respective practices is necessary.
A. THE DECEPTIONS OF THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY
In the early 1950s, almost half of all Americans were regularly con-
suming tobacco products.32  The allure of the cigarette was influenced by
the prevalence of smoking in popular films, as well as promotions of
smoking on billboards, in magazines, and on the radio, often by athletes
and celebrities.33  However, this changed in 1952 after Reader’s Digest
reported that research showed a statistical link between smoking and
lung cancer.34  These research results changed the public perception of
cigarettes, and over the next two years, cigarette consumption rates de-
creased for the first time.35  Around the same time, “the tobacco indus-
try’s own research began to find carcinogens in smoke and began to
32 Martin Olszynski et al., From Smokes to Smokestacks: Lessons from Tobacco for the Fu-
ture of Climate Change Liability, 30 GEO. ENV’T L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2017) (discussing how tobacco
norms evolved over time).
33 Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV.
853, 855 (1992) (discussing the popularity of cigarette smoking and the lack of tobacco related
product injury lawsuits in the 1950s).
34 Olszynski et al., supra note 32, at 10.
35 Id.
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confirm the relationship between smoking and cancer.”36  However, the
tobacco industry did not publish these results or disclose the mounting
evidence indicating that cigarettes caused lung cancer.37  Instead, the to-
bacco industry began “creating doubt and controversy surrounding the
health risks,”38 and responded “to the growing public concern by putting
filters on cigarettes and promising research into the health effects of
smoking.”39
As a result of the industry’s tactics, individual plaintiffs in the first
wave of litigation against the tobacco industry, starting with Lowe v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. in 1954,40 had difficulty proving that “tobacco-
related harms were reasonably foreseeable” at the time.41  The tobacco
industry argued that the foreseeability of adverse health impacts could
not be established unless the connection between “smoking and disease
became irrefutable.”42  In time, the evidence became increasingly unde-
niable with the publication of the U.S. Surgeon General’s report on
“Smoking and Health” in 1964, which concluded by stating that
“[c]igarette smoking is causally related to lung cancer in men; the magni-
tude of the effect of cigarette smoking far outweighs all other factors.”43
Thus, public perception of smoking had begun to change.
Throughout the 1960s, the tobacco industry tried to mitigate the
blow to their industry by using advertisements to deny that their products
caused cancer.44  During this time, Congress passed the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, which required cigarette manu-
facturers to place health warnings on cigarette packets, and warnings in
their broadcast advertising.45  However, tobacco companies were not de-
terred from their efforts to popularize smoking.  In 1989, at a hearing of
the U.S. Subcommittee of the Committee on Energy and Commerce of
the House of Representatives, it was disclosed that cigarette companies
had also worked to “spread their message” by paying to have cigarettes
36 Clive Bates & Andy Rowell, Tobacco Explained, ACTION ON SMOKING AND HEALTH





40 § 18:2. Historical Overview of Tobacco Litigation—The First Phase of Tobacco Litigation,
2 TOXIC TORTS LITIGATION GUIDE § 18:2 (2020) (noting Lowe was voluntarily discontinued by the
plaintiff).
41 Olszynski et al., supra note 32, at 10-11.
42 Id.
43 Bates & Rowell, supra note 36, at 6.
44 Id. at 40.
45 § 18:3. Historical Overview of Tobacco Litigation—The Second Phase of Tobacco Litiga-
tion, TOXIC TORTS LITIGATION GUIDE § 18:3 (2020).
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appear in mediums such as movies, which did not appear to be advertise-
ments at first glance.46  For example, Philip Morris, a tobacco company,
paid “$42,000 in 1979 to have Marlboro cigarettes appear in the movie
‘Superman II’ and paid $350,000 [in 1988] to have the Lark cigarette
appear in the new James Bond movie ‘License to Kill.’”47
In addition, tobacco companies began to (and continue to) market
“light” and “low tar” cigarettes, accompanied by advertisements promot-
ing these as healthier alternatives to traditional cigarettes.48  But tobacco
companies knew that there was virtually no change in the products, and
light cigarettes could deliver more tar and nicotine than advertised.49  In
this way, tobacco companies continued to deceive consumers as to the
harmful nature of their products, by convincing consumers that light and
low tar cigarettes are safe alternatives to smoking regular cigarettes.50
The Master Settlement Agreement (“MSA”) of 1999 came from the
culmination of states suing the tobacco industry for recovery of Medicaid
costs due to smoking-related illnesses.51  The MSA limited advertising,
including a ban on the use of characters and limitations on tobacco indus-
try sponsorship of sports events.52  Notably, the MSA required payments
of: (1) 206 billion dollars to the states spread out over a twenty-five year
period; (2) a 1.5 billion dollar payment to support state antismoking mea-
sures over a ten year time period; and (3) a 250 million dollar payment to
fund research into reducing youth smoking.53  In the wake of the MSA,
some states implemented tobacco control programs with the MSA funds
in order to reduce tobacco consumption.54  These tobacco control pro-
grams generally included: public education campaigns, school based to-
bacco prevention programs, and enforcement of “existing policies aimed
at curbing exposure to smoke in public places and youth access to
tobacco.”55
In sum, the tobacco companies were well aware of the harmful ef-
fects of their products, but they continued to promote their products any-
way without disclosing their research to their consumers.  When the link
46 Bates & Rowell, supra note 36, at 47.
47 Id.




51 Walter J. Jones & Gerard A. Silvestri, The Master Settlement Agreement and its Impact on
Tobacco Use 10 Years Later, 137 CHEST 692, 692-93 (2010).
52 Id. at 698 (e.g., use of characters such as Joe Camel).
53 Id.
54 Matthew C. Farrelly, et al., The Impact of Tobacco Control Program Expenditures on Ag-
gregate Cigarette Sales: 1981-2000, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 843, 845 (2003).
55 Id.
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between smoking and lung cancer became publicly widespread, tobacco
companies switched tactics and published advertisements that denied the
fact that tobacco caused cancer.  Eventually legislation was passed that
required cigarettes to be labeled with health warnings and banned ciga-
rette advertisements on television.  However, the tobacco companies
continued to subtly advertise by sponsoring their way into feature films.
Undeterred, tobacco companies are still deceiving consumers by continu-
ing to market light and low tar cigarettes.
B. HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF WITH THE OIL INDUSTRY
Archival documents show that Exxon knew their products had the
potential to change the climate as early as the 1950s.56  In 1954, ge-
ochemist Harrison Brown proposed research to the American Petroleum
Institute (“API”), the petroleum industry’s main trade association.57
Brown’s research proposal informed the API that fossil fuels had caused
atmospheric carbon dioxide levels to rise about five percent over the last
hundred years.58  “By the late 1970s and early 1980s, Exxon scientists
were explicitly aware that burning fossil fuels could lead to what they
called ‘catastrophic’ global warming.”59  However, like the tobacco com-
panies, Exxon decided to conceal this information and continued to pro-
mote their products instead of informing their customers.60
Exxon actively fought against the concern for climate change, echo-
ing the actions of the tobacco industry.  For example, Exxon became a
member of the Global Climate Coalition (“GCC”) along with several
other fossil fuel companies in 1989.61  The GCC is an organization that
was founded to “coordinate business participation in the scientific and
policy debate on the global climate change issue.”62  The Coalition op-
posed governmental action that was designed to address the emerging
scientific studies on global warming.63  In 1997, in light of the Kyoto
Protocol, other leading oil companies such as BP and Shell changed their
stance on climate change and abandoned the GCC.64  Exxon decided to
56 Benjamin Franta, Early Oil industry Knowledge of CO2 and Global Warming, 8 NATURE
CLIMATE CHANGE 1024, 1024 (2018).
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Supran & Oreskes, supra note 12.
60 Id.
61 UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SMOKE, MIRRORS, & HOT AIR: HOW EXXONMOBIL
USES BIG TOBACCO’S TACTICS TO MANUFACTURE UNCERTAINTY ON CLIMATE SCIENCE 9 (2007),
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/exxon_report.pdf.
62 Connecticut Complaint, supra note 18, at 22.
63 UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 61, at 9.
64 Id.
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double down instead, and helped to create a task force called the Global
Climate Science Team (“GCST”) to create a disinformation campaign
similar to that of Big Tobacco.65  An internal memo of GCC revealed
that the goal of the team was to ensure that average citizens recognized
the uncertainties in climate science.66
As the science of climate change became less deniable, Exxon
switched tactics to greenwashing.67  Enter Exxon’s new marketing strat-
egy: to emphasize their research into algae-based biofuels in their adver-
tising and thereby promote an image of corporate commitment to
developing low-carbon, more environmentally friendly fuels.68  Exxon
has “flooded the United States television market with advertisements”
about their efforts to research and promote alternative sources of en-
ergy.69  Exxon has also continued with their tried and true greenwashing
tactics by continuing to pay for advertorials.  For example, in 2018,70
Exxon published an article entitled “The Future of Energy? It May Come
from Where You Least Expect”71 that lays out Exxon’s research into al-
gae biofuels with clear graphs and bright colors.72  Additionally, the arti-
cle mentions how alternative fuel sources like biofuels seemed “poised to
enter the market” in the 2000s.73  Of course, there is no mention of how
Exxon contributed to fossil fuel production or GHG emissions during
this time.  Exxon also shares specific numbers for how many barrels of
biofuel it hopes to produce (10,000 barrels per day by 2025), but makes
no mention of how many barrels of oil it plans to produce from fossil
fuels at that time.  Instead, the article emphasizes how Exxon wants to
create the “next generation of biofuels” and “make the future of energy
literally green.”74
Like the tobacco industry, Exxon knew that their products were
harming consumers, and further, the global environment.  Exxon decided
to stay silent and continue to promote their products, while denying cli-
mate change.  Once confronted with undeniable evidence, Exxon
65 Id. at 10.
66 Id.
67 D.C. Complaint, supra note 17, at 59-60.
68 Plec & Pettenger, et al., supra note 7, at 460.
69 Id.
70 Tristan Bove, The Fossil Fuel Industry’s Influence on Environmental Journalism,
EARTH.ORG (Dec. 15, 2020), https://earth.org/fossil-fuel-industrys-influence-on-environmental-jour
nalism/.
71 Paid Post by ExxonMobil, The Future of Energy? It May Come From Where You Least
Expect, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/paidpost/exxonmobil/the-future-of-energy-it-may-





Kim: IS AN INJUNCTION THE RIGHT VEHICLE?
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2021
96 GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J. [Vol. 13
switched tactics from denial to greenwashing to continue to sell their
products while creating a false, greener image.
III. THE COMPLAINTS
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts brought the first of the three
complaints against Exxon’s greenwashing.  The attorney general brought
the suit, acting as the Commonwealth, against Exxon, which is registered
to do business in Massachusetts as a foreign corporation.75  The suit al-
leges that Exxon deceived, and continues to deceive, Massachusetts in-
vestors by (1) misrepresenting and failing to disclose material facts about
climate change;76 and (2) making materially false and misleading state-
ments to Massachusetts investors about its use of a proxy cost of car-
bon.77  Additionally, Massachusetts alleges that Exxon deceived and
continues to deceive consumers by (3) misrepresenting the environmen-
tal benefit of its “green” products and failing to disclose the risks of
climate change caused by Exxon products;78 and (4) promoting false and
misleading greenwashing campaigns.79  Amongst other remedies, Massa-
chusetts is requesting that the court: (a) determine that Exxon has vio-
lated and is continuing to violate the Massachusetts Consumer Protection
Act (“CPA”); (b) grant comprehensive injunctive relief; and (c) award
Massachusetts penalties against Exxon in the amount of $5,000 for each
violation of the Massachusetts CPA.80
The District of Columbia took their claim a step further than Massa-
chusetts and brought suit against three other petroleum companies in ad-
dition to Exxon, including Shell, BP, and Chevron.81  The District of
Columbia is represented by the Attorney General for the District of Co-
lumbia.82  The suit alleges that Exxon has violated section 28-3904 of the
D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act (“CPPA”), which prohibits
unfair and deceptive practices when offering, selling, and supplying con-
sumer goods and services.83  D.C. alleges that Exxon violated section 28-
3904 by: (1) using a long-term advertising and communications cam-
paign relying on climate change denialism to influence consumer de-
mand for their fossil fuel products; (2) making misleading or incomplete
75 Massachusetts Complaint, supra note 26, at 15.
76 Id. at 195.
77 Id. at 197.
78 Id. at 200.
79 Id. at 202.
80 Id. at 204-205.
81 D.C. Complaint, supra note 17, at 1.
82 Id. at 4.
83 Id. at 68.
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claims about their commitment to environmental sustainability; and (3)
aggressively marketing its fossil fuel products with misleading represen-
tations about the products’ environmental benefits.84  D.C. is requesting
that the court: (a) permanently enjoin the defendants from violating the
CPPA; (b) order the defendants to pay restitution or damages; and (c)
award civil penalties in an amount to be proven at trial.85
Lastly, Connecticut brought action against Exxon pursuant to sec-
tion 42-110 of Connecticut General Statutes, which prohibits  “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.”86
The attorney general brought the suit at the request of the commissioner
of the Department of Consumer Protection.87  Connecticut alleges that
Exxon violated section 42-110b by: (1) misleading consumers about the
existence of climate change, and whether human activity contributed to it
when Exxon knew otherwise;88 and (2) engaging in deceptive green-
washing campaigns to depict Exxon as environmentally conscious to sell
petroleum products to Connecticut consumers.89
Out of the three Complaints, Connecticut has the most robust and
diversified prayer for relief.  Similar to Massachusetts and D.C., Con-
necticut is requesting that the court: (1) find that Exxon engaged in unfair
and deceptive acts and practices; (2) enforce an injunction against Exxon
from engaging in any acts that violate Connecticut’s Unfair Trade Prac-
tices Act; (3) grant equitable relief “for past, present and future deceptive
acts and practices that will require future climate change mitigation, ad-
aptation, and resiliency;” and (4) order Exxon to pay civil penalties and
(5) to pay restitution to the State for all expenditures attributable to Ex-
xon that the State has and will have to make to counter the effects of
climate change.90  Additionally, Connecticut goes further by asking the
court to direct Exxon to: (6) yield revenue, profit, and gain achieved
through unfair acts or practices; (7) disclose all research and studies re-
lating to climate change in its possession; and (8) fund a “corrective edu-
cation campaign to remedy the harm inflicted by decades of
disinformation” that would be either controlled by the state of Connecti-
cut, or another independent third party.91
The Complaints argue that Exxon is currently greenwashing by
overemphasizing its commitment to biofuels, and harming consumers
84 Id. at 68-69.
85 Id. at 77.
86 CT Gen. Stat. § 42-110b (2012).
87 Connecticut Complaint, supra note 18, at 8.
88 Id. at 36-38.
89 Id. at 40-41.
90 Id. at 44.
91 Id. at 44-45.
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with this deception.92  According to its own promotional materials, Ex-
xon’s goal is to provide 10,000 barrels of algae biofuel per day by
2025.93  But Connecticut argued that if Exxon was able to achieve this
goal, the algae biofuels would only occupy approximately 0.2 percent of
its current refinery capacity,94 meaning that 99.8 percent of Exxon’s re-
finery capacity would still consist of fossil fuels.  Therefore, almost 100
percent of Exxon’s refineries would still consist of fossil fuels, while
they prominently promote their biofuels to paint themselves as a greener
company.  D.C. landed on similar numbers, alleging that, in 2016, “Ex-
xon earned $198 billion in revenue but invested less than 1% of that in
alternative energy research, including algae.”95
IV. ANALYSIS
The oil industry’s history of sitting on known risks, and using de-
ceptive advertising is substantially similar to the tobacco industry’s his-
tory, and the states draw on these similarities in their complaints.
However, there are also major differences between the two industries.
Whereas cigarette smoking is largely a matter of personal choice, wide-
spread reliance on oil and gas for fuel and other products makes consum-
ers more restricted in their choices about whether to engage in the oil
economy.
A. THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY’S DECEPTIONS ARE NOT A GOOD
PREDICTOR FOR BIG OIL’S GREENWASHING PRACTICE
The restrictions implemented on tobacco advertising have been
largely successful.96  The tobacco control programs resulting from the
MSA have reduced smoking rates over an extended period of time.97
Additionally, the health warnings on cigarette packaging have been
shown to decrease cigarette consumption.98
The prevalent misconceptions about light and low-tar cigarettes led
Congress to enact the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control
Act of 2009, which prohibited tobacco companies from producing and
92 Connecticut Complaint, supra note 18, at 33-34; D.C. Complaint, supra note 17, at 47-49;
Massachusetts Complaint, supra note 26, at 173-79.
93 Connecticut Complaint, supra note 18, at 33.
94 Id. at 33.
95 D.C. Complaint, supra note 17, at 48.
96 Ali Palali & Jan C. van Ours, The Impact of Tobacco Control Policies on Smoking Initia-
tion in Eleven European Countries, 20 EUR. J. HEALTH ECON. 1287, 1289 (2019), https://www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6856042/.
97 Jones & Silvestri, supra note 51, at 697.
98 Palali & van Ours, supra note 96, at 1289.
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distributing any products labeled or advertised as “light” or “low” unless
the companies can meet rigorous criteria established by the Food and
Drug Administration (“FDA”).99  If the company can meet the criteria, a
Modified Risk Tobacco Product order is issued from the FDA, which
allows companies to use the “light” and “low” terms in their labeling or
advertising; but if companies use those terms without the FDA order, the
claims can be considered health fraud.100  Exxon’s greenwashing of their
fossil fuel products has been compared to the tobacco industry’s adoption
of light and low-tar cigarettes, and if adopted, an injunction against Ex-
xon’s greenwashing of their biofuels could most likely look similar to the
criteria that is required of tobacco companies.
But does the tobacco industry provide a good model for determining
what measures to take in the oil industry?  Despite the similarities in the
actions of the tobacco and oil industries, consumer reliance on the oil
industry for basic needs is a major difference between oil and tobacco.
Petroleum products are part of American consumers’ everyday lives, in-
cluding transportation fuels, and feedstocks for making the chemicals,
plastics, and synthetic materials that are in almost everything.101  In
2019, 7.5 billion barrels of petroleum were consumed in the United
States.102  Out of the 7.5 billion barrels, forty-five percent was used for
motor gasoline,103 meaning almost half of petroleum consumption was
due to gasoline powered transportation.
Although buying a cigarette has little societal benefit outside of eco-
nomic benefit, oil and gas have become an integral part of our society
from transportation to heating homes.  There is no question that both
industries cause harm, but widespread reliance on the products of the oil
industry makes it different than the tobacco industry.  The current reli-
ance on oil limits consumer choice in deciding whether or not to use it.
An injunction against Exxon’s greenwashing thus would not necessarily
provide consumers with a better option.  In order to achieve results like
those in the tobacco industry, an injunction would have to be paired with
something else, such as government intervention and policies.  If Massa-
chusetts, D.C., and Connecticut, or other states, succeed in restricting
deceptive advertising, they may also need to enact additional government




101 What Are Petroleum Products, and What Is Petroleum Used For? U.S. ENERGY INFO.
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programs and policies to provide consumers with options for decreasing
dependency on petroleum products.
B. AN INJUNCTION AGAINST EXXON’S ALLEGED GREENWASHING OF
BIOFUELS BY ITSELF IS NOT AN EFFECTIVE WAY TO
MITIGATE CLIMATE CHANGE
An injunction against Exxon’s greenwashing practices may not be
an effective way to improve informed consumer decisions about their
fossil fuel consumption if no alternatives to petroleum products are avail-
able to consumers.  Therefore, governments should also implement poli-
cies to increase the availability of alternative energy products.  This
section explores how states can produce viable alternatives to petroleum
products by increasing access to electric vehicles and related
infrastructure.
1. An Injunction by Itself Would Not Significantly Change Consumer
Behavior
Connecticut argues in its complaint that Exxon’s advertisements
about biofuels misled reasonable consumers into believing that Exxon’s
products are “environmentally sound,” which deprived Connecticut con-
sumers of accurate information about their purchasing decisions.104  Sim-
ilarly, D.C. claims that if consumers understood the “full degree” of the
harm that Exxon’s products contribute to climate change, they would
have chosen not to purchase from Exxon, or at least would have pur-
chased less.105  In other words, both complaints argue that consumers
would have behaved differently had they known the truth.
But would a change in advertising practices influence consumers in
a significant way?  Because buying gas is a routine part of millions of
Americans’ lives, it seems doubtful that fewer consumers would buy Ex-
xon products if they hadn’t seen advertisements about biofuels.  Accord-
ing to a report by CNBC, as of July 2020, approximately 280 million
cars, trucks, and SUVs were registered with U.S. motor vehicle depart-
ments.106  However, just 1.4 million plug-in electric vehicles (“PEVs”)
have been sold in the United States,107 which suggests that there are still
104 Connecticut Complaint, supra note 18, at 34.
105 D.C. Complaint, supra note 17, at 61.
106 Phil LeBeau, 25% of Cars in the U.S. are at Least Sixteen Years Old as Vehicle Age Hits
Record High, CNBC, (July 28, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/28/25percent-of-
cars-in-us-are-at-least-sixteen-years-old----record-high.html.
107 How Many Electric Cars are on the Road in the United States? USA FACTS (Oct. 22,
2020, 10:17 AM), https://usafacts.org/articles/how-many-electric-cars-in-united-states/.
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over 278 million cars in the United States that rely at least partly on gas
or diesel.  Therefore, a significant majority of consumers who drive cars,
regardless of whether they see an advertisement from Exxon or not, still
have to buy gas for their vehicles (whether from Exxon or another
company).
Climate change is a serious issue that needs to be addressed imme-
diately.  Unfortunately, filing for an injunction to stop current green-
washing practices for a product that is a necessity in consumers’ lives
does not seem like an effective way to combat climate change unless
there are accessible alternatives to fossil fuels.  Consumers cannot make
environmentally friendly choices without an oil substitute in place when
they rely on petroleum daily, which is why the government should step
in by creating more incentives and infrastructure to promote electric
vehicles.
2. Government Policies Need to Provide Consumer Choice
While choice of fuels seems very limited, consumers arguably do
have choice in deciding whether to buy electric cars over fossil-fuel pow-
ered cars.  In addition, there are already some incentive programs in
place to promote buying an electric car.  For example, at the federal
level, a program administered by the U.S. Department of Energy pro-
vides that “[a]ll-electric and plug-in hybrid cars purchased new in or af-
ter 2010 may be eligible for a federal income tax credit of $7,500.”108
States can also develop incentive programs.
However, there are still many other obstacles, like the lack of charg-
ing stations in many areas, that deter consumers from purchasing electric
cars that run entirely without gas.  Despite the growing popularity of
electric cars, critics argue that “governments, regulators, and utilities
aren’t doing enough” to accommodate or encourage the acceleration of
this growth.109  In addition, because “40 percent of Americans don’t live
in single-family homes where [they] could have a personal charger,” the
feasibility of owning and using an electric car can be more difficult for
some people than others.110  Without accessible public charging stations
for individuals without their own parking spaces with charging ports, the
decision to buy an electric car is not practical.  Consequently, many con-
108 Federal Tax Credits for New All-Electric and Plug-in Hybrid Vehicles, U.S. DEP’T OF
ENERGY (Feb. 2021), https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/taxevb.shtml.
109 Lawrence Ulrich, Charger Desert in Big Cities Keeps Electric Cars from Mainstream,
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sumers have limited power to exercise their preferences for electric cars
and cleaner, safer fuels.  In order to effectively combat climate change
and give consumers meaningful choices, governments need to increase
the availability of electric cars and charging stations.
In California, Governor Gavin Newsom issued an executive order in
September 2020 that aims to increase the availability of electric vehicles.
Executive Order N-79-20 directs the state to reduce reliance on fossil
fuels by requiring the sales of “all new passenger vehicles to be zero-
emission by 2035.”111  Newsom is pushing the state to make electric cars
the new normal.  The order also requires state agencies and private com-
panies to “accelerate deployment of affordable fueling and charging op-
tions.”112  Increasing the number of electric cars and charging stations
available, at least in California, could help eliminate two of the key barri-
ers that prevent consumers from purchasing electric cars.  Other states
should adopt similar measures to push the availability of PEV cars and
charging stations.  Ceasing the sales of fossil fuel cars by 2035 is an
ambitious goal, and while some states may not find this to be feasible,
they could still adopt similar policies to accelerate the deployment of
affordable fueling and charging stations.
Connecticut and Massachusetts have both started initiatives similar
to California to increase the number and accessibility of electric cars.113
Connecticut has established a state goal for 500,000 vehicles to be PEVs
by 2030.114  Additionally, Connecticut plans to implement policies to ed-
ucate consumers on the costs and benefits of owning an electric vehicle
(“EV”).115  The suggested policies also include methods of marketing,
education, and outreach to engage Connecticut consumers through “ex-
periential opportunities such as ride-and-drive events,” as well as encour-
aging leaders at the forefront of the EV movement to establish credibility
111 OFFICE OF GOVERNOR GAVIN NEWSOM, Governor Newsom Announces California Will
Phase Out Gasoline-Powered Cars & Drastically Reduce Demand for Fossil Fuel in California’s




113 CONN. DEP’T OF ENERGY & ENV’T PROT. (DEEP), Press Release: DEEP Launches Electric
Vehicle Roadmap (Apr. 22, 2020), https://portal.ct.gov/DEEP/News-Releases/News-Releases---
2020/DEEP-Launches-Electric-Vehicle-Roadmap; MASS. COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF TRANSP. IN
THE COMMONWEALTH, Choices for Stewardship: Recommendations to Meet the Transportation Fu-
ture, https://www.mass.gov/lists/choices-for-stewardship-recommendations-to-meet-the-transporta-
tion-future (last visited Apr. 9, 2021).
114 CONN. DEEP, ELECTRIC VEHICLE ROADMAP FOR CONNECTICUT 12 (2020), http://
www.dpuc.state.ct.us/DEEPEnergy.nsf/c6c6d525f7cdd1168525797d0047c5bf/f7ed4932eec438d
0852585520001c81b/$FILE/EV%20Roadmap%20for%20Connecticut.pdf.
115 Id. at 92-93.
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with consumers.116  Massachusetts, on the other hand, has established a
commission to advise the governor’s office on implementing new tech-
nology initiatives, including strategies for providing the infrastructure
necessary for the increased deployment of PEVs.117  By creating policies
that allow charging stations to become more accessible to more people,
states can eliminate a key barrier to buying an electric car and thereby
give consumers more choices in deciding how they engage with the fos-
sil fuel industry.
Another potential barrier to buying an electric car is the cost.  Cur-
rently, the up-front cost of buying an electric car can be higher than that
of buying a fossil fuel burning vehicle.118   However, by 2035, “zero-
emission vehicles will almost certainly be cheaper and better than the
traditional fossil fuel powered cars,” as the upfront cost of electric cars
are projected to be similar to conventional cars in “just a matter of
years.”119  Additionally, the costs of maintaining and powering an elec-
tric car, mile by mile, are “far less” than a fossil fuel burning vehicle.120
It is also important to consider that not everyone who is buying a car is
going to buy new.  In fact, on average, a quarter of cars and trucks on
American roads are at least sixteen years old.121  Therefore, new policies
implemented to encourage the sale of EVs may not persuade everyone to
immediately purchase an EV and will not completely eliminate the use of
gasoline powered vehicles.  This gradual change could be both a benefit
and a detriment.  It would be detrimental to the environment to delay the
elimination of fossil fueled powered cars, but it could be beneficial to
consumers if they are able to educate themselves more on the topic of
EVs in order to make informed choices when deciding whether to buy an
EV.
Although this paper has focused on expanding the accessibility of
EVs, governments can also introduce other policies to encourage greener
transportation.  For example, in their 2020 Emissions Gap Report, the
United Nations Environment Programme (“UNEP”) recommended in-
creasing public transport and active travel (such as bicycling and walk-
ing) through public policies and infrastructure.122  Policy suggestions
include subsidized public transport and incentives for cycling and bicycle
116 Id.
117 Alternative Fuels Data Ctr., Support for Plug-In Electric Vehicles (PEVs) and Autono-
mous Vehicles (AVs), U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://afdc.energy.gov/laws/11935 (last visited Apr.
9, 2021).
118 OFFICE OF GOVERNOR GAVIN NEWSOM, supra note 111.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 LeBeau, supra note 106.
122 UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME (UNEP), Emissions Gap Report 2020, at 66 (2020).
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purchases.123  Suggested infrastructure included opening dedicated cy-
cling lanes and expanding cycle networks, as well as implementing car-
free residential zones.124  With these types of changes to policy and in-
frastructure, local governments can further promote greener transporta-
tion alternatives in addition to increased EV access.
Government has an important role in ensuring that consumers have
choices when engaging in commerce with the fossil fuel industry.  Al-
though an injunction would affect Exxon’s actions, consumer behavior
would not change significantly if there are not ready alternatives to fossil
fuels.  Consumers’ options can be expanded by increasing the accessibil-
ity of EVs and EV charging infrastructure, as well as through outreach
and education about the EV industry to inform consumers of their
choices.  Governments can also encourage more environmentally
friendly transportation options by increasing public transport and active
travel.  An injunction against Exxon’s greenwashing must work in tan-
dem with government policy for the injunction to be effective in chang-
ing consumer behavior.
C. WHAT COULD AN INJUNCTION WITH GOVERNMENT POLICY LOOK
LIKE?
An injunction against Exxon to prevent further greenwashing, if
modeled after the tobacco industry, could utilize restrictions similar to
those that were applied to restrict deceptive advertising of tobacco prod-
ucts and require labeling of light and low-tar cigarettes.  A look at how
tobacco advertising is restricted could therefore be useful for envisioning
how a similar injunction might apply in the case of fossil fuels.
Under the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, tobacco compa-
nies must meet rigorous criteria and receive an order for a Modified Risk
Tobacco Product (MRTP) from the FDA before they can use the terms
light or low tar in their advertising and labelling.125  In order for an
MRTP application to be successful, the applicant must “demonstrate that
the product will or is expected to benefit the health of the population as a
whole.”126  The FDA must also consider the following factors, among
others, when reviewing an application:
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. Light, Low, Mild or Similar Descriptors, supra note 99.
126 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Modified Risk Tobacco Products, https://www.fda.gov/tobac
co-products/advertising-and-promotion/modified-risk-tobacco-products (last visited Apr. 9, 2021).
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• The relative health risks to individuals of the tobacco product that
is the subject of the application;
• The increased or decreased likelihood that existing users of to-
bacco products who would otherwise stop using such products will
switch to the tobacco product that is the subject of the application;
• The increased or decreased likelihood that persons who do not use
tobacco products will start using the tobacco product that is the
subject of the application.127
In other words, the FDA must consider the product’s potential health
risks and how the advertising is likely to influence the behavior of ex-
isting tobacco users as well as non-users.
This regulatory structure could work for Exxon’s biofuels to ensure
that there is potential change before allowing Exxon to advertise about
their green products.  If a similar regulatory structure were applied to
Exxon, the company would first have to demonstrate that their product is
expected to benefit the entire population.  This would require Exxon to
show that its claims of benefiting the environment through the develop-
ment of algae biofuel have merit before they can use those claims in their
marketing.  Admittedly, under the broad question of benefiting the popu-
lation, Exxon’s greenwashing would probably still be permitted, because
the research they are conducting, though minimal, is beneficial.  This is
where the additional factors would come in to evaluate the health risks
associated with Exxon’s products, and the likelihood that existing oil
consumers would switch to using Exxon biofuel.  If there is an increased
likelihood that oil consumers would switch to biofuel, it seems likely that
Exxon biofuel would be approved.  In contrast, if the product is likely to
influence non-consumers to start using biofuel or Exxon products in gen-
eral, including petroleum products, there could be less likelihood of ap-
proval.  It would be contradictory if Exxon’s application to advertise
greener fuels actually led to an increase in the purchase of their petro-
leum products.  Thus, an application and approval process modeled after
the tobacco industry would only be the first step.
The next step would be to adopt additional measures to promote
increased consumer choice in deciding to participate in the economy of
fossil fuels.  If Exxon’s biofuel application is denied because they are
greenwashing rather than offering healthy and viable options for con-
sumers, consumer choice would continue to be limited with respect to
buying petroleum products.  Although this might prevent Exxon from
deceiving consumers, unless additional steps were taken to eliminate ob-
stacles and provide incentives for purchasing electric cars, little change
127 21 U.S.C. § 387k(g)(4).
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would result from the restrictions.  But if the government implements
programs to make EVs and charging stations cheaper and more available,
this could encourage more people to purchase them.  Additionally, it
would be important to educate consumers about EVs and their accompa-
nying infrastructure, as well as other alternatives, to enable consumers to
make informed decisions.  Eliminating greenwashing narratives, to be
successful in addressing climate change, must therefore work in conjunc-
tion with other programs to advance meaningful alternatives to fossil fuel
powered cars.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, an injunction against Exxon’s greenwashing is not
going to be effective without further government action to increase via-
ble fossil fuel alternatives.  Currently, consumers do not have a choice in
participating in the fossil fuel industry.  There is no denying the harm
that Exxon has caused by misleading the public about climate change.
Further, Exxon’s greenwashing of products is continuing to deceive con-
sumers about the harm caused by Exxon’s products, and this must be
stopped.  But preventative measures, like regulatory restrictions that
worked for the tobacco industry, may not be an exact fit when applied to
the oil industry.  This is because of American consumers’ reliance on oil
in their everyday lives.
The states filing for injunctions against Exxon’s alleged greenwash-
ing are engaged in a noble cause, but an injunction is unlikely to be very
effective without further actions from the government to give consumers
actual choices in whether or not they want to participate in the fossil fuel
economy.  Though some state governments are already providing incen-
tives for purchasing EVs, governments must do more to make these alter-
natives more accessible by increasing availability of PEVs and charging
structures, and educating consumers about the EV industry.  Ultimately,
states that pursue lawsuits similar to Connecticut, D.C., and Massachu-
setts, should consider implementing such measures in conjunction with
an injunction, to make the alternatives to fossil fuels more accessible.
Consumers are more conscientious than ever in the fight against cli-
mate change, but they need the government to create accessible alterna-
tives to fossil fuels in order to have a choice in green transportation.
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